Conflict+Management+in+Global+Politics+-+Illegal+Arms+Traficking

=Evaluating Attempts to Address Arms Trafficking to Manage Global Conflicts= Ana - Rae - Marie

Background
Illicit arms trafficking fuels civil wars, contributes to sky-rocketing crime rates and feeds the arsenals of the world's worst terrorists. Particularly troubling is the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). SA/LW accounts for an estimated 60-90% of the 100,000+ conflict deaths each year (Small Arms Survey 2005) and tens of thousands of additional deaths outside of war zones. They are also the weapons of choice for many terrorists. Of the roughly 175 terrorist attacks identified in last year's State Department report on //[|Patterns of Global Terrorism]//, approximately half were committed with small arms or light weapons. (1) In the hands of terrorists and other criminals, these weapons have the capacity to kill dozens, even hundreds, of innocent civilians. A shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile - available on the black market for as little as a few thousand dollars - can bring down a commercial airliner. Even a couple of $100 assault rifles can inflict horrendous casualties, as evidenced by the November 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt, during which 6 terrorists armed only with assault rifles, pistols and knives systematically slaughtered 58 tourists. (5)  **[|Arms trafficking in Honduras] ** There are an estimated 850,000 firearms in circulation in Honduras. 258,000 firearms are officially registered with the government, according to a report by the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights. More than 80 percent of homicides in Honduras involve a gun. **[|Arms trafficking in Somalia] ** In 2008, the United Nations estimated that up to 80 percent of all arms, ammunition and supplies that were supplied to the transnational government of Somalia were diverted to the black market. The firearms ended up in the hands of private individuals, opposition groups and arms traffickers. **[|Arms trafficking in Central America] ** Between 45 to 80 million weapons are circulating across Central America, according to the head of US Southern Command. Most of the weapons are left over previous civil wars and conflicts within the region. Many of the weapons are currently being used by Mexican drug cartels. **[|Ammunition smuggling seizures in Arizona] ** Ammunition for firearms in Mexico is strictly regulated, creating a black market smuggling trade from the United States. In Fiscal Year 2007, the six entry ports in the border state of Arizona seized 760 rounds of ammunition from smugglers. In the 2011 Fiscal Year, 95,416 rounds of ammunition were seized by Custom officials. (2)  Arms trafficking in Mexico: In 2009, Mexico reported 7,724 drug war-related deaths. In January 2010 the number of people killed in Ciudad Juárez alone reached a stunning 227. March 13, 2010, nearly 50 people were killed in the same city, including employees and family members of the U.S. Consulate. Most scholars and politicians believe that these deaths are all related to drug gang activity. Mexico has very strict gun-ownership laws. While the country’s constitution allows for citizens to bear arms, the conditions it places on this ownership through amendments to the constitution are much more limiting. Indeed, only one entity is permitted to sell weapons, and it is run by the army. This does not imply that the situation is perfectly controlled, however; there are certainly ways around any law or institutional arrangement. Yet the violence in the northern border states of Mexico seems to be nurtured not only by weapons acquired illegally from Mexico, but also by those trafficked illegally from the United States. President Obama and GOA in April 2010 stated: "While it is impossible to know how many firearms are illegally smuggled into Mexico in a given year, about 87% of the firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced in the last five years originated in the U.S., according to data from Dept. of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. According to U.S. and Mexican officials, these firearms have been increasingly more powerful and lethal in recent years" (3)

Arms Trafficking in Columbia: Columbia has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Most of these homicides are related to fire arms of some sort. Highly organized criminal structures such as drug trafficking mafias and paramilitary groups are well- armed and dangerous. There are many private security companies, some of which use illegal weapons. Weapons and ammunition are being smuggled into Colombia, very often in return for drugs. Regional cooperation and improved border control are essential to cut the links between drug trafficking, organized crime and insurgency. The homicides related to illegal weapon trafficking in Columbia is 8 times higher the the international rate. (4)


 * Statistics**


 * Value of Conventional Arms Transfers in 2004**: **$34.75 billion**


 * Top Five Arms Exporters** (Worldwide, 2004)
 * #1 - United States ($18.55 billion)
 * #2 - Russia ($4.6 billion)
 * #3 - France ($4.4 billion)
 * #4 - United Kingdom ($1.9 billion)


 * Authorized Small Arms Sales** (Worldwide, Annual): **$4 billion** (estimate) (6)

- This is an example on the methods used for weapon trafficking.
 * The Otterloo incident** - In 2001, an Israeli arms dealer operating out of Panama duped the Nicaraguan government into selling him 3000 AK-47s and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition. The broker said that he was procuring the weapons on behalf of the Panamanian National Police, a claim ostensibly substantiated by a Panamanian end-user certificate. It was a lie. The end-user certificate was a forgery and the Panamanians had no knowledge of the deal. On November 2nd, the weapons were loaded into a Panamanian-registered ship named the Otterloo, which departed from the Nicaraguan port of El Bluff the next day. Two days later, it arrived in Colombia where the actual recipients - members of Colombia's vicious paramilitary groups - were waiting to claim their prize.

Sources: 1. [] Retrieved on October 16, 2011. 2. [|http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/IssueBrief3ArmsTrafficking.html#ter] Retrieved on October 16, 2011. 3. Lisa Guatecha, http://www.fpif.org/articles/arms_trafficking_at_the_us-mexico_border, Retrived on October 16, 2011 4. United Nations office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf, Retrieved October 16, 2011 5. The Illict Arms Trad, http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/IssueBrief3ArmsTrafficking.html, Retrieved October 16, 2011 6. Illict Arms Trade, http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/IssueBrief3ArmsTrafficking.html, Retrieved October 16, 2011 7.Small arms, terrorism, and OAS firearm convention //(pages 24-25 & 28-29)// //The OAS general secretariats report on the incident.//

**Current Efforts to Interdict Illegal Arms Trade** **The U.S. Response ** The United States leads the world in efforts to secure and destroy surplus and obsolete small arms and light weapons and eliminate terrorist access to man-portable air defense systems. Below are brief descriptions of these and other U.S. SA/LW initiatives: > Arms Trades Treaty: <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 16px;">-  On October 30 2009, UN members voted in favor of forming an Arms Trade Treaty. 153 countries voted in favour, 19 abstained and one country (Zimbabwe) voted against. Negotiations on the Treaty began in 2010, and an agreement on a Treaty should be secured in 2012. It will help to effectively regulate the international trade in conventional arms. - An Arms Trade Treaty would be a legally binding agreement between States that they will all use the same high standards in assessing whether to export conventional arms. This will help regulate the global arms market to prevent weapons reaching the hands of terrorists, insurgents and human rights abusers. - Each state would remain in control of its arms export control arrangements, but would be legally obliged to undertake a risk assessment on applications to export arms covered by an ATT, against the criteria agreed under the Treaty. The criteria would be based on existing obligations and commitments to prevent human rights abuse, uphold international humanitarian law, and to promote stability, prosperity and security. (2) Sources: 1. [|http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/IssueBrief3ArmsTrafficking.html#ter] Retrieved on October 16, 2011. 2. Foreign common wealth office, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/arms-control/arms-trade-treaty/, Retrieved October 16, 2011
 * **<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 16px;">SA/LW Destruction and Stockpile Security **<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 16px;"> - Since 2001, the State Department's Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program has facilitated the destruction of over 800,000 surplus small and light weapons and 80 million rounds of ammunition in 23 countries. The [|Defense Threat Reduction Agency] has worked with officials in 19 countries to improve the security and management of additional SA/LW stockpiles.
 * **<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 16px;">Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) **<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 16px;"> - Since the late 1990's, the U.S. has led a global campaign to eradicate terrorist acquisition and use of MANPADS. Their efforts have resulted in [|several international agreements] on the manufacture, transfer, and storage of MANPADS, the destruction of over 13,400 excess missiles in 13 countries, and national controls on MANPADS exports and [|end-use monitoring] that is among the most rigorous in the world. (1)

Evaluating Effectiveness of Current Efforts and Suggestions for Improvement
**<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 16px;">The Effectiveness of MANPADS in the hands of non-state actors ** <span style="display: block; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 16px; text-align: left;">Like most weapon systems, MANPADS require a level of operator skill to use effectively. The batteries generally provide power for less than a minute, and the operator has to be able to acquire a target and launch the missile before the battery runs out, which can be difficult to do without continued practice. Additionally, much training in gauging target range, aspect and speed is required to be able to effectively employ MANPADS. Many of the MANPADS on the black market are early-generation designs that need the operator to have a rear-aspect shot to have a high probability of locking onto the target. This limits the ability of the shooter to find a suitable firing position. <span style="display: block; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 16px; text-align: left;">These factors may explain why hit rates in Iraq and Afghanistan have been low compared to the number of missiles fired. <span style="display: block; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 16px; text-align: left;">In addition, the effectiveness of MANPADS in the hands of non-state actors is limited by finite battery life. MANPADS have their own battery packs to provide power to the launcher and sight and to set off the preliminary charge that pushes the missile out of the tube. The battery is a specialized piece of equipment and it has a finite life before replacement is required. <span style="display: block; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 16px; text-align: left;">The lifetimes of rocket propellants and the coolant required for the seeker head of the missile are other factors that could limit the useable lifetime of MANPADS in the hands of non-state actors. Over time these chemicals will deteriorate, especially if the missile is stored in poor conditions with extremes of temperatures. Kept in their custom-designed storage cases, however, they could last for decades. (1) =**<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',Times,serif; font-size: 19px;">Suggestions for Improvement for <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 16px;">SA/LW Destruction and Stockpile Security **= <span style="display: block; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 16px; text-align: left;">The successful management of an SALW program will require a high standard of accounting, which at the same time should be as transparent as possible. Receipts shall be given for weapons surrendered, and certificates shall be prepared at the moment of destruction. Plans shall be made to publicize the numbers of surrendered weapons, although publicizing detailed locations and community statistics may not be an appropriate measure, and the risks of such a move shall be taken into account. The accountancy process during a pure DDR program, rather than wider SALW control intervention, shall be transparent enough for all factions to see that equal or proportional numbers of weapons are being surrendered by all parties. It also needs to be accurate enough to ensure that every weapon registered as handed in must also be registered as destroyed. (2) Sources: 1. [] Retrieved on October 16, 2011. 2. [] Retrieved on October 16, 2011.